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**Doctoral School of Regional- and
Business Administration Sciences**

Leader: Prof. Dr. Tamás Dusek

Tamás Bakó

**From Yugoslavia to Present Serbia – Relations of Regional and
Economic Policy and Public Administration**

Theses of Doctoral Dissertation

Supervisors:

Edit Lőrinczné Bencze PhD, professor

Szilárd Rác PhD, research fellow

Győr

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Introduction

The reunification of Yugoslavia after World War II was accomplished in a historical situation, where the survival of the country was essential not only on regional, but European, even on world political level. The country was situated at the meeting point of spheres of interest, a fact that gave rise to certain advantages, nevertheless, it had several disadvantages as well.

The second Yugoslavia, due to the combined effect of world political, inner political, socio-political and economic reasons, was forced to introduce a new model of economic policy. The top-down, involuntarily and artificially created, so-called Yugoslav economic structure was accompanied by a new ideology which resulted in the so-called system of workers' self-management. This dissertation seeks to explain how this maverick system of economy was a success, which reasons led to the initial success and why the structure had reached its actual limits by the mid-1960s, foreshadowing the inevitability of the regime's fall. The economic system, due to social and political reasons, was incapable of renewal, it was unable to provide for a broader role for market economy. Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and then Serbia up until now still had to face different aspects of this problem.

Beside the economic problems, the very existence of Yugoslavia was continuously challenged by the enormous regional disparities. This problem has not been solved, in spite of the fact that significant aids were granted to underdeveloped areas through different development funds. Between 1945 and 1990, in certain Yugoslav regions regional disparities between developed and disadvantaged areas decreased, however, the gap e.g. between the most and least developed areas continued to deepen.

Yugoslavia made the mistake of receiving large, fix-term, preferential loans, thus, society and the economy itself grew accustomed to consumption far exceeding the level of the country's productive capacity. It was then that the powerful crisis, the frustration, the dissatisfaction, the political problems and all the difficulties (ethnic, religious) that could be expected in such conditions arose.

The self-management system was handicapped by the workers' opportunity to increase their own wages and, as no internal brake was installed to counteract this process, this economic structure could not work well in the long run. The system could only survive as long as foreign subsidies and later, loans arrived. Yugoslav political leaders had no interest in implementing reforms because it would have led to a shift of power in society, which would have meant the loss of the party's central board's absolute power. The Serbian political leadership, and even the majority of the population, did not support profound change, did not have the courage, knowledge, will. Within Yugoslavia, Serbian society did not want to accept and still, only in part accepts, that the state can no longer be the main driver of development.

When Serbia introduced the socialist system it found its natural ground there, since its roots are identical to the patriarchal (collectivist) roots of society. This was not the case in Slovenia and Croatia. The Serbs welcomed Tito and his Communist Party, as well as the self-management system with open arms. There was a misconception that the coexistence of self-management, socialism, and the (capitalist) market formed a sustainable system. Tito's excellent idea was the Not-Aligned Movement, and –by taking a valuable role- he managed to include himself into the bipolar world. Self-management would have had catastrophic economic consequences if the country had not have such favourable political and market positions.

This led directly to nationalism and wars, which was compounded by a misconception that Tito had inflicted on the Yugoslav population, and thus, indirectly, on the Serbian people's awareness on the greatness of their country and nation. Without the sanctions imposed on Serbia during the war, the results of the “alibi transition” in Serbia would have been the same as with the restrictions, however, FRY, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro, would have had with fewer economic and human sacrifices in the 1990s.

Although the process of regime change in Serbia was not hindered by the sanctions imposed on the country in the 1990s, however, they shaped the process to be more complex and unique. It was not the war that hindered the transition, but it rather offered an excellent excuse for a postponement, as well as to delay it. At the time of the sanctions, an economic system based on smuggling, corruption and crime emerged, which was accompanied by monetary emission without reserves.

With regard to Milošević's fall, it should also be borne in mind that the demand for a change was not based on a strategic consideration regarding the country's future, but it was a consequence of the crisis the country was struggling with. The so-called DOS program incited fundamental changes in 2000, envisaged a liberal market based change of the economy, which was more or less implemented by 2006.

The economic downturn and the global economic crisis in 2009 hit Serbia very seriously, and it was followed by a 7-year period of recession. Serbia reached the GDP level of the year 2008 in 2016, a modest, however, a continuous increase only started at the end of 2015. In political sense a slow regression can be observed in Serbia over the last decade.

The above changes had a serious impact on the self-government and the development of Serbian cities. The local management and regional policy operating in Serbia in the era of the self-management system had far greater autonomy than in the Milošević's Serbia in the 1990s, when the structure of local governments' was fundamentally changed, since the central government swept away everything in this field as well. We also have to bear in mind that before Tito's death, the New Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 led to such oddities in the area of regional policy that each member state set up its own oil refinery and own iron works, which have consumed enormous costs completely unnecessarily. Nor can it be ignored that in the 1980s the member states rotated in the federal presidency (somewhat similar to the current, rotating presidency of the Council of EU) when the place of birth, as well as the residence of the delegates to the presidencies of the respective member states was one of the most significant factors determining the use of development funds, pushing the rational economic needs and demands into the background.

In the 2000s the local governments have been given a new autonomy, but -due to the economic crisis, which affected Serbia severely- the selection of development projects and the definition of their financial framework have gradually come under central control. From 2012 this field fell in the competence of the Belgrade governmental administration, as a result of which political interests again prevailed over economic rationality.

On the level of Serbian local governments it can be stated that the flaws of the workers' self-management system have persisted until this day: too many people, wages too high. If the local governmental and municipal level reduced the number of employees in accordance with the legal norms – i.e. four clerks per thousand inhabitants- the number of employees would suddenly drop by 10%. Local governments spend almost 15% of their budgets on covering the losses of public companies.

The urban concentration of space-shaping forces is dominant today. As a result, the role of cities in regional development is growing. Among the factors influencing territorial competitiveness, large cities and their network are the most stable factors. This theoretical background underpins one of the main research directions of this dissertation, which focuses on the local governments of the five largest Serbian cities and the diverse structural, administrative and operational features of these cities, detailing the cities' budgetary situation, reasons of their successful ventures and failures, as well as their developmental differences within the Second Yugoslavia, FRY and then within the independent Serbia.

The Aim and Structure of the Dissertation

The aim of this dissertation is to present the operation of the Yugoslav economic policy model (self-management system), the development of the country's regional and development policy, initial successes and reform ideas after the system's exhaustion, as well as the reasons of the downturn that forced Serbia to develop the current system of local and regional politics.

In my dissertation I am also seeking an answer to the question how Hungary's southern neighbour, which before the change of regime had a more open and flexible economy, a much more developed banking system than other socialist countries, moreover, a key player in international trade in goods, as well as in the transmission of technological and technical developments, could -due to the rejection of regime change- become the greatest loser in the region. The dissertation explores the above topics in four chapters. The first chapter deals with the re-establishment of Yugoslavia and its circumstances, presents the country's economic policy direction, and discusses the process of the country's disintegration from the 1970s. The section also provides the description of the country's regional policy and the wastages present in territorial development due to domestic policy

reasons. The second chapter summarizes the consequences of the effects of the war and the total economic embargo, the failure of economic reforms, and the development of the situation in Serbia since the regime change following Milošević era. The most extensive third chapter focuses on the territorial background of all this, examines the Yugoslav local-governments, the regional policy of the country, and then describes the current situation arising from the transformational compulsion. Finally, I present an in-depth analysis on the survival and transformation of municipal, urban, urban development, regional development, budgetary and utility companies in five major cities in Serbia, all complemented by the current state of regional policy. In the fourth chapter the results, conclusions, and further research directions are summarized.

The content of the dissertation and the order of the chapters serve the purpose of describing the most important events and changes not only by historical, but also by causal reasons, intending to explain the processes, which are sometimes difficult for Hungarians to understand. Social systems and decision-making processes that are “foreign” in many aspects had led to inexplicable steps in many areas, which provide an appropriate justification for many social, economic policy, regional, development and urbanization issues.

The war and the embargoes imposed on the post-1992 Yugoslavia, accompanied by a massive internal migration, completely changed the economic and regional map of Serbia. Some cities and regions have remained underdeveloped, but at the same time, for example, the role of Novi Sad within the country has increased and, despite these circumstances, has been able to develop in almost all areas. After the war, foreign investments and infrastructural changes completely rewrote the power relations within the country, which was seriously influenced by the policy of local governments, their relations with Belgrade and their capacity to promote their own interests.

The spatial structure, former settlement development and agglomeration policies of the larger cities have changed, the challenges affecting urbanization have transformed the former unified nature of the cities, nevertheless similarities of Yugoslav and later, Serbian cities are still reflected. Migration to the cities and the role of the capital and the larger cities had been increasing, for which the necessary infrastructural developments were only partially realized. There are many reasons for this, both financial and political, and in many cases a lack of state and / or municipal competence. At the end of the analysis, I make an attempt to present

the development characteristics of the five, completely different, largest Serbian cities and make my conclusions. This process differs greatly from the same process in Hungary counterpart, therefore –in my opinion- the incorporation of data and examples is crucial, which, in addition to the historical overview, even in regional comparison could only be defined as “only” as an individual development (e.g. Development Policy). In Serbia, regional and development policy still bears the marks of the old system of self-management, despite the fact that several, European-style development aspirations have become dominant in Serbian urbanism. In my view, the greatest change in the operation of cities was the compliance with foreign investors, i.e. the expectations of multinational companies became the most decisive, which process was supported by the central administration.

The Research Questions and Hypothesis

The basic goal of the research was to seek an answer to the question why the new economic policy was established in Yugoslavia after World War II, what was different and unique in comparison with other countries’ economic systems and how the most capitalist socialist country became the most socialist capitalist state.

Why can we say that Yugoslavia’s local government system was completely unique, in spite of the fact that it was intending to fit the basically socialist social requirements? To what extent did the industrialization and infrastructural development determine the main directions of development and why was it so decisive for our southern neighbour to remain outside both the Eastern and Western block? What effect did this have on the development of the settlements, to what extent did the local bodies have a say in the operation of the local government and to what extent did the centrally determined regional development affect the development of the local governments? How could a completely new form of economic politic control develop in Europe? Why did the new, unique economic model seem viable and what measures had to be implemented by the political leadership later, when the first signs of crisis were encountered? To what extent was the local government, regional and development policy unique, which Yugoslavia, later Serbia specific features can be traced to this day? How can it be explained that the main loser of the fall of the Berlin Wall was Yugoslavia, and indirectly Serbia? What transformations were implemented after the fall of the Milošević re-

gime, how did the privatization process take place? To what extent did the regional and development policy change and which features have remained unchanged, just as in Serbia in the 1990s, mainly regarding the larger cities?

The detailed exploration of the above questions is going to be based on the conclusions and answered questions of my already published and forthcoming publications. The reason and motivation to address these issues stems from my area of interest, the curiosity of the topic, the actualities of regional policy, economic policy, foreign economic policy, and foreign economic policy context. Due to the size of the topic six hypotheses were formulated focusing on the main questions.

(H1) The cohabitation of self-management, socialism and (capitalist) market cannot form a sustainable structure. In the bipolar world Yugoslavia could only maintain its worker self-management system due to its special geopolitical situation and resulting favourable market position.

(H2) The socialist system has found its natural ground in Serbia, since its roots are identical to the patriarchal (collectivist) roots of society. Thus, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall not only Milošević, but the entire Serbian society rejected the change of regime with a direct consequence of Yugoslavia's breakup.

(H3) Regional policy has been unable to the structural change, permanent and systematic decrease of the territorial disparities within Yugoslavia despite the massive, state funded, financial support for the less developed regions.

(H4) It can be established that the centralized, so-called „socialist” local government system established in the Milošević era survived in Serbia, change can only be seen in the relationship with the central government.

(H5) As an economic factor, development dependence on the central power just became more decisive in the Western-Balkan state and local initiatives are affected by this as well.

(H6) Serbian cities have been developing mostly on their own (economic, social, intermunicipal) bases, however, within the framework of changing state structure. In this regard Belgrade has taken a separate path as federal capital, and later capital city.

Methodology

Due to the complexity of the topic, the analysis of the issue had to be carried out by the combined use of several disciplines (economics, regional science, history) and methodology, I cumulated the main reasons for the changes in all discussed periods with respect to the chronological order, i.e. the historical chronological method played a key role in my work. I compiled my hypotheses using works summarizing, evidencing, describing, evaluating and analysing the conclusions on the issue, as well as on questions and answers formulated after the conversations with the experts dealing with the topic. The temporal and spatial indicators of the empirical studies reveal specific phenomena in the field of the regional economy, which are only characteristic of Serbia and which previously were not or were only partially examined. I used the comparative method when analysing the cities.

The dissertation uses not only international and Hungarian academic literature, but Yugoslav, Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian resources, as well as publications, analyses and conclusions of international organisations, statistical bureaus, ministries and business magazines.

When describing the historic development of cities I used statistics on the local governments' websites, financial statements on the local governments' budgets, data on foreign investments and data on the websites of municipally owned utility companies, then based on the analysis of these I formulated my conclusions. The quality and detail of the available data show differences, however, the greatest divergences can be seen in the questions regarding urban development and other urbanization related issues.

Dimensions of the different sources, that is international and Hungarian, scientific and governmental, as well as local sources contradict each other in several aspects, therefore I was forced to check the data and results. Thus, the critical regard and the comparative analysis of the statements of the official, governmental and local-governmental communication channels, which occasionally do not reflect reality, became determining factor in the dissertation.

For the above reasons it was necessary to update the changes in the legal background and the government measures affecting both economic policy and cities, local governments, and to supplement the previous findings, contexts and to reconsider these effects.

The inaccuracies and sometimes contradictions are still evident in Serbian statistics, so compiling the conclusions of the dissertation was much more difficult than preparing a summary and comparative and analytical material concerning an EU (especially Western European) Member State.

In terms of findings my huge personal advantage had been that I was in Serbia all the way, thus, the parties concerned and our private conversations with them contributed to formulating the answer for many questions.

Based on the suggestions made at the workshop debate I summarized a nomenclature in the introduction in order to facilitate the interpretation of terms concerning state forms and state organizations, which have changed multiple times and are different from those in Hungarian. The KRTK Border Research Group that helped in the gradual acquisition of academic thinking and way expression, had an important role in the development of this dissertation.

Conclusion, results

The goal of this dissertation was to detect the reasons of diverse development of Serbia's local government system, the present regional development policy and the five largest Serbian cities, which can explain why such huge disparities have developed within a country. In addition to the natural and geographical features, one of the keys to the success of cities and municipalities is how they managed to break away from the old Yugoslav traditions, how they were able to convince the private sector and foreign investors to take up and adopt a new economic approach, which can ensure sustainable success in the medium and long term.

The essay provides a complete picture from World War II till our days, i.e. it presents in a coherent framework the changes of state systems from Yugoslavia to Serbia, the main courses of events and it formulates answers for the question why the instructions from „Belgrade” have always been the most decisive factor in regional and development policy, as well as in economic policy, even on local level.

In my opinion, the results of the research offer novelties and updated information not only for Hungarian regional research professionals who are interested in Vojvodina or Serbia, but for Hungarian entrepreneurs and potential investors with business ideas in our Southern neighbour. In addition to the infrastructural developments and municipal procurement the dissertation envisaged to present the outlines of regional cooperation possibilities (urban governance, economic policy guidelines and trends). The topic and field of this paper is new, since neither Hungarian, nor Serbian researchers have not dealt with this area in its complexity, they have only dealt with single sub-questions. I had a huge advantage when preparing the dissertation, namely I have been present in person throughout the changes in the last almost three decades, thus, I was able to make, however, subjective, but –on some level- external observation of the mentioned topics and their reasons. I consider it important to emphasize that the material can be used in several areas, such as the Hungarian foreign administration, foreign economic strategy, international relations, political science, and understanding the changes in South-East Europe.

The novelty of the study is that it does not compare only the regions of Yugoslavia until 1990 in terms of economic policy and regional policy, but introduces the macroeconomic and development policy viewpoint as well, and it carries out a comparison based on the same aspects regarding the local governments, and studies their present day operation in the 5 largest Serbian cities. The limitations of the doctoral research include that there are not sufficient sources available. The Serbian regional science lags behind the Hungarian and there is very little Serbian research on urban development and regional development. This is one of the reasons why a large proportion of the literature used is information available on the internet, which I had to summarize, analyse and draw conclusions based on them.

Evaluation of the Hypotheses

(H1) The cohabitation of self-management, socialism and (capitalist) market cannot form a sustainable structure. In the bipolar world Yugoslavia could only maintain its worker self-management system due to its special geopolitical situation and resulting favourable market position.

Hypothesis: verified.

(T1) The rapid growth of industrial production in Yugoslavia between 1947 and 1953 was due to the “exceptional economic treatment by the West”, since it was the use of the American raw material aid that made possible the three shift production in the factories (the President of the USA -based on his discretionary rights-secured support by 480 separate laws). As a result, Yugoslavia received -on value at the time- 9 billion US dollars from 1947 to 1953. After Stalin’s death, when world politics changed and suddenly U.S. aids to Yugoslavia dried up, economic growth dropped back in the mid-1950s. The unsustainability of the system is well illustrated by the expensive production corrected by constant price increases and the low efficiency due to low capacity utilization. Economic growth only resumed when Yugoslavia received \$ 100 million in military reparations from the Federal Republic of Germany to repay World War II forced labour and \$ 30 million in aid (in gold) from the Soviet Union. This was immediately reflected in the growth rate (13.3 percent) and industrial production, which in 1959 became 2.5 times higher than the production achieved in 1952. By the early 1960s, the economy began to slow down again, which could only be offset by continuous foreign borrowing, until Tito’s death in 1980, when it was already worth \$ 20 billion.

The self-management system has its specific distortions: the so-called Ward’s phenomenon, i.e. the companies in the self-management system did not react to price increase by decreasing production, but by increasing it; the Furubotn–Pejovich’s phenomenon, where not accumulating capital is the self-managing companies’ interest, but borrowing money continuously, leaving the repayment to those who come afterwards. All these are serious malfunctions, which proved the unsustainability of the system.

(H2) The socialist system has found its natural ground in Serbia, since its roots are identical to the patriarchal (collectivist) roots of society. Thus, after the collapse of the Berlin Wall not only Milošević, but the entire Serbian society rejected the change of regime with a direct consequence of Yugoslavia's breakup.

Hypothesis: verified.

(T2) In Yugoslavia, the political transition, and the transition to popular democracy, took place as early as the autumn of 1945, i.e. at the time of liberation. While in other Central-Eastern European countries nationalization was not complete until 1948, in Yugoslavia almost all industry was in the state's hands by the end of 1946. However, on the territory that is Serbia today, all this has already happened at the moment of the appearance of the partisan army. The solution of the ethnic disparities' problem and the guarantee of overcoming potential conflicts was safeguarded by the faith in the centralization of power which Tito personified. Instead of building democratic institutions, much of Serbian society believed in a highly centralized, regulated state. The largest number of members of the law enforcement forces (army, police) were Serbs who supported Milošević after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a politician who considered himself a defender of the existing regime. Free parliamentary elections were held in 1990 about the same time in the former Yugoslav member states. In Slovenia a six-party coalition (DEMOS), in Croatia a right wing catch-all party (Croatian Democratic Union- HDZ) formed government, while in Serbia the Milošević-led communist-successor party (SPS) won the elections.

(H3) Regional policy has been unable to the structural change, permanent and systematic decrease of the territorial disparities within Yugoslavia despite the massive, state funded, financial support for the less developed regions.

Hypothesis: verified.

(T3) The budgetary Fund created to insure a higher pace development for the member states' territories lagging behind and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo provided 405.8 billion dinar for the underdeveloped regions between 1966 and 1987 (in the last three years, between 1988 and 1990 39.5 billion dinar). The distribution of the assets of the Fund was the following from 1987 on: Bosnia-Herzegovina 114.7 billion dinar (28.4%); Montenegro 39.5 billion dinar (9.6%); Macedonia 82.4 billion dinar (20.4%); Kosovo 168.3 billion dinar (41.5%).

As a result, a substantial development occurred in some regions due to the funds, other aids and benefits (the major part of the aids and subsidies from the World bank), which were allocated to the member states lagging behind and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, however, the general social development level in the Province of Kosovo did not change. The development partially alleviated the differences, especially in comparison with the most developed areas, however, they still remained large.

The Development Fund also partly served the political oligarchs of the member republics to distribute money as they wished, without definite market criteria. A classic example for this practice was the Agrokomerc agricultural processing plant in Velika Kladuša, Bosnia- Hercegovina, as well as the several million dollars spent in the Cazin area. The main problem was that the capital at the Fund's disposal was spent in many cases without planning. The government of the member state or the province set up industrial facilities in their „own” yard, without taking into account the cost recovery or the already existing similar facilities in other member states. This is confirmed by the fact that each republic had its own ironworks. Political decisions on the construction of new factories were taken regularly based on false feasibility studies, thus were the erroneous investments carried out. Facilities, which were never operational or have ever become profitable were created for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars (e.g. Medijapan sheet metal factory in Kraljevo, the FENI in Kavadarci, “Jadral” in Obrovaci, etc).

(H4) It can be established that the centralized, so-called „socialist” system of local government in Serbia established in the Milošević era survived, change can only be seen in the relationship with the central government.

Hypothesis: verified.

(T4) In the middle of 2015 the Ministry of Public Administration and Local Government stated in an analysis that on the level of Serbian local governments the communism (self-management system) still prevails: too many employees, their wages are too high. For years, wages in local governments have been increasing in a higher rate than legal, therefore the consumption of productive investments have almost been completely eliminated and the economic-strategic distribution of the spending have deteriorated on municipal level. Between 2000 and 2015 the assets/ expenditures spent on wages have grown by 25%.

This growth rate is almost four times the 6.5 % allowed by the government at the time, as well as it is multiple of the increase that would have followed if the required index had been met or the statutory wage cut in 2014 had happened. Local governments spend almost 15% of their budgets (approximately 30 billion dinars) on covering the losses of public companies. In Serbia, subsidies amounting to approximately 0.8% of GDP are granted to local governments, which is three times as much as in Central European countries comparable to Serbia (0.3%). In Europe, transport is almost the only field subsidized, while Serbian local governments provide financial support to waterworks, sewer operators, public cleaning and even district heating only companies.

(H5) As an economic factor, development dependence on the central power just became more decisive in the Western-Balkan state and local initiatives are affected by this as well.

Hypothesis: partially verified.

(T5) In Serbia the limiting factors are very decisive/significant and they make the coordination and management of economic activity difficult on local level. The aspiration of cities and local governments to make independent decisions and enforce economic policy might lead to divergences in local and national development goals and might result in the depoliticization of economic policy goals. Due to the high dependence on the central government in Serbia, local initiatives are very rare. When there are many institutions operating at different levels of the state, it is difficult to determine the responsible one. The transfer or rejection of responsibility has long been a feature of Serbian national and local government activity. In Serbia, confidence in power is declining at almost every level. Lack of trust in public institutions is the main reason, in general, why the chances of further development are limited at all levels. Another problem is that the level of both enforcement and security of ownership are also very low.

(H6) Serbian cities have been developing mostly on their own (economic, social, intermunicipal) bases, however, within the framework of changing state structure. In this regard Belgrade has taken a separate path as federal capital, and later capital city.

Hypothesis: verified.

(T6) In the last decade of the 20th century, the economic and social development of the five largest Serbian cities examined in the dissertation took a completely different path. The performance of the economy fell sharply in all cities, with the smallest decline in Belgrade and in the centre of processing of agricultural produce, Novi Sad, which city has been well performing despite the economic embargo. Throughout the nearly two decades passed since the democratic transformation, these processes have changed to a certain amount in the five largest Serbian cities. Development can be observed in all cities, however, not in the same areas or to the same extent. The most significant economic growth since 2001 has occurred in Belgrade and Novi Sad. Belgrade has become an “import distribution” centre. The role of the capital city and the region close to it was further strengthened within Serbia (concentrating more than 40% of GDP) due to the multinational corporations’ centres in Belgrade and the high share of real estate development enabling rapid GDP growth.

Directions of Future Research

There are several fields closely linked to the subject and to such sociological and political issues that are crucial regarding the whole region's future, e.g. the current status and future developments of unemployment, emigration of young people, migration, the future of the region's European integration, education, R&D.

It would be worthwhile to study what role is played by the region, now called the Western Balkans, in world politics, in European politics, and what role it will play in the near future. An equally important area is the examination of the diversity of Serbia's foreign policy, which -in many ways- is trying to cling to the old heritage of Tito and seeking to follow similar guidelines in character (Serbia's military neutrality, Shuttlecock policy between Moscow and Washington, etc.).

Making international comparison using the methodology of regional science (Yugoslav member states, capital cities, large cities). A larger monographic work could include not only Serbia, but Croatia, Bosnia –Herzegovina, or even Slovenia, thus, we could get a complex picture of where Serbia is in the region, to what extent it lagged behind or progressed in comparison with the other republics of the former common state.

Serious opportunity for deepening historical research - additions to Yugoslav economic history, the role of the army (JNA and its command) as a cohesive force (economic, ideological, political) and later (e.g. Tudjman) as a disintegrating factor. The specific decision-making role of Tito and the State party, Tito's legacy, the situation in Serbia - the only member republic with provinces - , the conscious weakening of Serbia, this was the reason of the later regime's designated path, nationalism.

The presentation of the conclusions in form of a handbook might become suitable for the practical use of research results.

The Author's Publications in the Topic of the Dissertation

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